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TOWARD A THEORY OF FEDERAL TAXATION:
A COMMENT
DANIEL

Q POSIN*

SUMMARY OF THIS ARTICLE

THE AMERICAN income tax has come under increasing
criticism because of its complexity. Various alternatives to the American income tax have been suggested,
the most prominent of which is the consumption tax.
This Article discusses the consumption tax and the other
alternatives. This Article concludes that the reasons for
the complexity of the tax system transcend the particular
type of tax which is imposed. The roots of complexity of
the tax system lie in the complexity of the economic system that is to be taxed, the variety of non-revenue raising
uses to which the tax system is put and in the inevitable
political pressures that are brought to bear on the Congress as the tax-creating entity. This Article concludes
that the federal income tax should be seen for what it is:
an inevitably complex tax that is a mixture of an income
tax and a consumption tax. This Article argues that a
wealth tax should be added to the already mixed system.
The wealth tax adds balance to the mixed system and taps
a legitimate base of taxation which is not now subject to
tax. The Article explains how a wealth tax would work in
conjunction with the present system and discusses the fiscal and economic implications of it.
* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law.
© 1985 by Daniel Q. Posin.
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COMPLEXITY OF THE PRESENT INCOME TAX

The American income tax has come under major criticism for its great complexity. The criticism has ranged
from the occasional exegesis in the popular press to more
scholarly critiques. Various alternatives to the income tax
have been suggested in response to these criticisms. The
major alternative considered first in the scholarly journals
and more lately by policy makers in Congress and in the
Administration is the consumption tax. Therefore it is
useful first to consider the consumption tax, both as a
possible alternative to the present tax and to see what insight it may provide into the present income tax.
BACKGROUND OF THE CONSUMPTION TAX

Generally, taxes can be divided into two categories:
taxes that are levied on persons (including corporations
and other entities as well as natural persons) and taxes
that are levied on transactions. Taxes levied on persons
would include such taxes as the income tax, the consumption tax, estate and gift taxes, the wealth tax, and the head
tax (flat amount of tax on each person). Taxes levied on
transactions would include sales taxes, stamp taxes, and
the value added tax.
Taxes levied on transactions have the great virtue of being simpler to administer. Primitive societies tend to rely
on transaction taxes. However, in modern, complex societies where it is necessary to raise greater amounts of revenue, and where wealth is unevenly distributed, it is
generally deemed necessary to tax people based on their
ability to pay. The society must keep track of individuals
and the society must have a scale for measuring ability to
pay.
There are three major' ways to measure the ability to
pay. The measure can be made according to income, consumption, or wealth. The income tax has long been regarded as an outstanding measure of ability to pay.
Generally speaking, the greater the net income, the
greater the ability to pay and the greater the tax that can
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be extracted. The greater tax is extracted from those with
higher incomes for two reasons: (1) to effectively raise additional revenues, and (2) to bring about some redistribution of wealth in the society. These two reasons have
been the basis of the American income tax throughout its
history. Taxing people by their ability to pay does not
necessarily imply a progressive rate schedule. A proportional tax on income- everyone paying 10% of his or income - will of course cause those with higher incomes to
pay more. The question of progression in rates is a somewhat separate issue which I do not address directly at this
time.
The second possible way to tax by ability to pay is the
consumption tax. The consumption tax should not be
confused with a sales tax, which is a tax on transactions.
In the consumption tax, the amount of tax levied depends
on the total of the dollar value of the consumption transactions. In the consumption tax, the amount of the tax
that is levied depends on the total of the dollar value of
the consumption transactions in which the taxpayer engages during the tax year. Thus record is kept of the dollar value of the consumption transactions of each
individual. The tax rate is then applied to this total dollar
volume. The tax rate can be either proportional-10%
on everybody-or, as is usually suggested, the tax rate can
be steeply progressive, applying a higher and higher rate
to incrementally larger amounts of consumption. Various
technical reasons, discussed below, argue for a progressive rate schedule.
The consumption tax is not a recent gimmick as far as
tax reform is concerned. On the contrary, the idea of taxing people on their consumption is one of the oldest and
most distinguished ideas in the tax law. Thomas Hobbes,
writing in Leviathan, 300 years ago, stated:
.. .the equality of imposition consists rather in the equality of that which is consumed, than of the riches of the
persons that consume the same. For what reason is there,
that he who labours much, and sparing the fruits of his
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labour, consumes little, should be more charged, than he
that living idly gets little, and spends all he gets; seeing the
one has no more protection from the Commonwealth than
the other? But when the impositions are laid upon those
things which men consume, every man pays equally for
what he uses; Nor is the Commonwealth defrauded by the
luxurious waste of private men.
Note that one of Hobbes' great concerns was with the
man who lives off his capital. This situation carries over
to the present day as a concern with the U.S. income tax.
Over one hundred years ago John Stuart Mill argued
for a consumption tax before a committee of Parliament.
A distinguished group of economists followed Mill in subsequent years in supporting the consumption tax-Alfred
Marshall in England, Pigou in France, Irving Fisher in the
United States, and Luigi Einaudi in Italy. More recently
in 1955 the British economist Nicholas Kaldor argued for
the tax most effectively in his book entitled "An Expenditure Tax."
The first statement of the case for a consumption tax in
the modern American setting was by Professor William D.
Andrews, writing in the Harvard Law Review in 1974. His
article sparked a vigorous debate that continues in the law
reviews and the economic journals down to the present
time.
Thus, the consumption tax has an outstanding pedigree. It is indeed an aristocrat of ideas in taxation.
How

THE CONSUMPTION TAx WORKS

The first issue with regard to the consumption tax involves keeping track of each person's consumption during
the year. Indeed the practicalities of implementing a consumption tax were of great concern to many of the early
economists who were writing on this subject.
But keeping track of everyone's consumption is not as
hard as might first appear. It is generally agreed that the
way a consumption tax would work would be that account
is first kept of each individual's income. This of course is
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something that taxpayers or their advisors do now. Having ascertained everyone's income, the next step is to determine what each person has saved or invested during
the year, if anything. Saving or investing generally occurs
in discrete blocks, for which the taxpayer gets records, so
accounting for saving or investing is not particularly difficult. Then the equation is set up: Income - Saving =
Consumption. It is assumed, with justification, that everything that the taxpayer received in income that he did not
save he consumed. Furthermore, if the taxpayer does not
save but in fact consumes some of his capital, i.e. engages
in dissavings, that is charged to consumption. Dissaving,
or reducing capital, is also something that can be easily
kept track of. Thus the true equation for the consumption
tax is: Income - Saving + Dissaving = Consumption.
To the dollar amount of consumption is applied a progressive rate structure.
COMPARISON OF THE CONSUMPTION TAX AND THE

AMERICAN INCOME TAX

One of the insights that emerges upon consideration of
the consumption tax is that the present American income
tax is not really an income tax at all. Economists and students of the tax law generally agree that a true income tax
would measure income according to the following
formula: Income equals consumption plus saving. This is
the well-accepted definition of income first propounded
by the economist Henry Simons in 1938.
When viewed in that light it is clear that the American
income tax is not a pure income tax. While the American
system does prima facie tax income, it contains very many
of the elements of a consumption tax. Consider again the
formula for income: Income = Consumption + Saving.
For the man who consumes everything he earns, the income tax comes to be the same as the consumption tax.
The two bases are the same in that case. This is the situation indeed for a great many people in the American
economy. For those who do manage to save a little, the
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amount of saving is small compared to the amount of consumption. Once again, in such cases, the income base and
the consumption base come to about the same thing.
But consider the people who can save a great deal.
Much of the saving in the American economy is not taxed.
Unrealized appreciation in the value of assets held is not
taxed. If the stock market goes up 20% in one year, the
increased value in the stocks held is not taxed until the
stocks are sold (and even then the tax is likely to be at the
low capital gains rates). The increase in value of homes is
not taxed. (Even on the sale the increase in value of the
home is not taxed if various rules are complied with). The
increase in value of retirement plans, IRA's, Keogh Plans,
life insurance, and annuities is not taxed. Taxpayer contributions to many of these savings media are deductible
and hence not taxed. Income from state and local bonds
is not taxed. Favorable depreciation schedules and investment tax credit rules in effect allow income from depreciable business or investment assets not to be taxed.
What is the consequence of this? Consider again the
theoretical formula for an income tax. The taxpayer is
taxed on Income = Consumption + Saving. To the extent that in the American tax system savings are not taxed,
the savings factor in that formula drops out. That formula
then approaches Income = Consumption.
Thus it is clear that the American income tax is a mixed
tax-it is partly an income tax but is also partly in important respects a consumption tax. Recently literature that
has debated the relative merits of an income tax versus a
consumption tax has tended to lose sight of the fact that
the present-day American system is already in large measure a consumption tax. Thus most of the debate has
been wide of the mark.
REPLACING THE AMERICAN INCOME TAX WITH THE
CONSUMPTION TAX

I have thus far described the history of the consumption
tax and discussed how it works in theory and practice.
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The discussion has also established that the American income tax is not a pure income tax but is a mixture of an
income tax and a consumption tax.
The next issue fairly addressed is: Why scrap our present mixed tax system and replace it with a pure consumption tax? I would assert that the burden of proof lies with
the advocates of a consumption tax. After all, our present
tax is in place and it would be disruptive to change it.
Thus the advocates of a consumption tax would have to
show that the consumption tax has a clear superiority over
our mixed tax for them to make a case for the consumption tax being adopted.
A rich variety of reasons have been advanced to assert
that the consumption tax would be a better tax than the
income tax. I have alluded to some of these reasons
already.
1.

HOBBES' MORAL REASON

Hobbes in the quote set forth above really suggested a
moral reason, namely, that when a man saves, his capital
is still in the pool of the society's capital; it is helping the
society's capital to grow, and therefore to the extent that a
man saves the state should not tax him. It is only, according to the Hobbesian view, when a man has drawn some
resources for purely private consumption that he has actually deprived the society of capital. Only then has he benefited in some way, and only then should the state tax
him.
There are severa answers to this theory. First, it is inaccurate to say that amounts in saving confer no benefit
on the saver. Great amounts of saving stashed away in the
form of real estate or financial assets certainly do confer a
benefit-the benefit of economic security. Thus there is a
benefit and thus morally it could be taxed.
There is a second answer also to this Hobbesian approach. It is by no means clear that all savings build up
the society. If a man buys and holds gold bars that does
nothing to increase the productivity of the society. Or
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suppose a man buys for $300,000 a stamp in which an airplane was printed upside down. In what way does such an
investment build the wealth of the society? Such investments do not go to increase the wealth of the society.
They just involve speculators moving sums of money
around among themselves. Why should we allow a deduction for such investments? Yet this is what the consumption tax allows.
Perhaps a deduction should not be allowed for such
non-productive investments, only productive investments.
However, recall that the formula for imposing the consumption tax is as follows: Consumption (the thing to be
taxed) = Income -

Savings. Thus taxpayers want things

to be denominated saving as much as possible. If we start
splitting hairs as to what kind of saving gives rise to a deduction and what kind does not, we start to lose one of
the presumed virtues of the consumption tax: its supposed simplicity, a matter about which I will have more to
say presently.
2.

NONCOMPARABILITY OF INCOME

One of the major arguments in favor of the consumption tax over the income tax is that when the state taxes
income, it is not taxing comparable units. Consider a tenured professor of law who makes $40,000 a year. Compare him to a plumber who also makes $40,000 a year.
Should these two gentlemen really be taxed the same?
Might not the plumber be well advised to save some of his
income, in case the demand for housing declines and he
cannot find work? This has been known to happen.
Whereas the tenured professor of law is free to spend
everything he makes in full confidence that his income is
assured for the balance of his career.
In terms of ability to pay taxes, who really has more income here-the free-spending law professor or the frugal
plumber? A compelling case can be made that the law
professor's income is really worth more than the
plumber's and so the professor should pay more taxes.

FEDERAL TAXATION
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The same point can be made about a variety of other
sources of income. $50,000 of net rental income from a
choice piece of real estate is worth more than $50,000 of
salary income to a corporate executive who may have a
tenuous grasp at best on his job because his company is
about to be taken over.
The income tax is blind to this problem. It taxes all
these people as though their dollar had equal worth. Indeed, it would be impossible to do otherwise with an income tax, impossible to make comparisons of the value of
individual dollars of income based on the likelihood that
such payments will continue in the future.
But the proponents of the consumption tax assert that
the consumption tax sorts all this out automatically. If a
plumber is worried about his future he will spend less and
save more than the free-spending law professor. And so
the free-spending law professor will wind up paying more
taxes on a consumption base. All the varieties of security
of income get washed out and we let the taxpayers themselves decide how secure they feel, how much they will
spend on consumption and therefore how much tax they
will pay.
It seems that the advocates of the consumption tax
score a point here. The consumption tax does account
for the noncomparability of income units in a way that the
income tax cannot (although differences in personality
will also play a role in amounts saved versus amounts
spent in consumption). It is questionable whether the
non-comparability of income is enough of a point in itself
to cause us to scrap our present income tax, but it must be
conceded that it is a point for the consumption tax.
Although non-comparability is a good argument, it is
questionable whether it is sufficient to effect a change in
our tax system.
3.

EFFECT ON INVESTMENT

One of the earliest criticisms of the income tax as compared to the consumption tax was that the income tax dis-
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couraged investment. John Stuart Mill first enunciated
this criticism in his Principles of Political Economy. Indeed, Mill went so far as to suggest that the Income Tax
caused savings to be taxed twice. That extreme position
has been largely discredited. However, even in the present time a lively debate continues in the literature concerning the extent and the way in which the income tax
discourages saving and the consumption tax encourages
saving.
My response to this is what difference does it make?
The significance of this criticism depends on whether the
circumstances are such that savings are desirable. Sometimes it is desirable to encourage savings and sometimes it
is not. For example, the U.S. economic recovery of 19821983 was led primarily by consumer spending. Presumably a tax which discouraged spending and encouraged
savings would have dampened this recovery.
Furthermore, as discussed above, the American income
tax is a mixed system where a number of things are done
to encourage savings in the areas of pension plans, failure
to tax unrealized appreciation, favorable treatment of capital gains, interest-free state and local bonds, accelerated
depreciation, investment credit and IRA's. Congress frequently adds provisions to encourage savings.
Arguably, an ideal tax should be neutral on the matter.
We want, so the argument goes, people to make decisions
as to whether to save without regard to tax considerations. But neither tax is neutral on the matter. Both influence behavior in one direction or the other.
So I do not see that the consumption tax scores any
great points on this issue.
IDIOSYNCRATIC EXAMPLES:

THE MISER AND THE

SPENDTHRIFT

The proponents of each of these taxes can advance examples as to how the other tax would fail under certain
sets of facts.
The supporters of the income tax can assert, for exam-
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pie, that the consumption tax fails to reach the hard-working miser; i.e., the man who works and accumulates great
amounts of wealth but lives very modestly. His wealth will
give this man great security and indeed may even confer
upon him great economic and political power. Yet this
process of accumulation of wealth is only lightly taxed by
a consumption tax if the man lives modestly.
The advocates of the consumption tax have several answers to this, however. Although they concede that the
income tax would reach the miser on this set of facts, the
income tax does nothing about already established wealth
that may be inherited or that is otherwise of long
standing.
Furthermore, the proponents of the consumption tax
can argue that the income tax totally fails to take account
of the spendthrift. Recall that Hobbes was worried about
the spendthrift in the quotation set forth earlier. The
man who owns vast amounts of capital and consumes it on
a grand scale is taxed very lightly, if at all, by the income
tax whereas the consumption tax would fall on him heavily. The most brilliant example of this is given by British
economist Nicholas Kaldor, discussed above as one of the
early advocates of the consumption tax. He gives the example of a man who owns millions of dollars worth of
gold and sells it off a little at a time to live in a grand scale
being taxed the same as a beggar, under an income tax.
Based on this discussion of idiosyncratic examples, the
arguments seem to be of equal weight. Both the consumption tax and the income tax fail to reach people that,
based on some standard of ability to pay, one would think
should be heavily taxed. The consumption tax fails to
reach the miser, and the income tax fails to reach the
spendthrift.
I have the temerity to note at this point that the reason
we feel that it was unjust, under the examples given
above, for the miser and the spendthrift not to be taxed
heavily was because they were both wealthy! I will discuss
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the possibilities and limitations of a wealth tax later in this
article.
4.

SIMPLICITY

One of the strongest points argued for the consumption tax by its supporters is that a consumption tax would
be simpler. If this were true it would be a major point,
probably the most important one in favor of the consumption tax. The complexity of the Internal Revenue Code
that would presumably be avoided arises from provisions
dealing with the treatment of such items as corporate reorganizations, capital gains and losses, retirement plans
and installment sales.
Although I agree that the complexity of the American
income tax referred to certainly exists, I believe that the
complexity results from the fact that the American income
tax is not a pure income tax. The American income tax,
as discussed above, is a mixed tax, and this contributes
strongly to its complexity. For example, consider two
(out of many) significant contributors to the complexity of
the American income tax, which are somewhat related:
(1) The favorable treatment of capital gains, and (2) the
requirement of a realization in order to tax appreciated
gains on property.
With respect to the first of these, if capital gains ceased
to be given favorable treatment but were just taxed at the
same rates as all other forms of income, then we would be
spared the'many agonizing definitions and rules in the Internal Revenue Code and its associated Treasury Regulations used to determine whether a particular transaction
qualifies for capital gains treatment. It has been reliably
estimated that if the favorable treatment of capital gains
were eliminated from the Internal Revenue Code, its size
would be reduced by one-third to one-half. A pure income tax would not have any favorable treatment for capital gains and therefore would be much simpler than the
present American income tax on that ground alone.
With respect to the second of these contributors to
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complexity, if the increase in the value of property held
were taxed on an annual basis regardless of whether it was
sold or otherwise disposed of, a great deal of complexity
would drop out. The whole area of pension and deferred
compensation tax law would drop out, as the value of
amounts put aside by the employer for the employee's
later use would simply be taxed in full to the employee.
The whole raft of rules of tax-free exchanges on individual and corporate transactions would drop out as taxpayers would simply be taxed on the increase in value of
property in their hands independent of whether they had
sold or exchanged it. There are a variety of other special
exclusions and deductions in the American income tax
that would have no place in a theoretically pure income
tax. All of these special provisions contribute greatly to
the complexity of the American income tax.
Thus, as this discussion indicates, the theoretically pure
income tax is a great deal simpler than is the American
income tax. Moreover, the consumption tax is not without its complexities. While the formula, Consumption =
Income - Saving, looks simple enough, what is to be
done with the purchase of a major capital asset, such as
the taxpayer's home? The proponents of the consumption tax generally agree that when such a massive amount
of savings is made in one year, the appropriate approach
would be to spread the deduction for such savings out
over more than one year to more accurately reflect the
consumption tax base. Providing rules for such a spread
out, of course, involves complexity. When account is
taken of matters such as this it seems fair to say that the
theoretically pure consumption tax is not especially more
simple than the theoretically pure income tax.
Therefore, from the point of view of complexity it
might just as easily be argued that we should do away with
the various imperfections in our income tax and get back
to a theoretically pure income tax as that we should go to
a consumption tax. When put in that light it becomes
clear that we are not going to get rid of the complexity in
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our tax system any time soon. The same forces that give
rise to complexity in the income tax will give rise to complexity in the consumption tax, if it is enacted. These
forces arise from the pervasive nature of the federal tax
system. In a sense it can be said that the federal tax system reaches everyone, every year, on every financial
transaction.
The complexity of the tax system, therefore, arises from
causes that run deeper than the type of tax that we have.
The complexity arises from the complexity of the society
to be taxed, the tendency to try to make up for the failure
of national policies in other areas, such as the complex
favorable tax treatment of employee accident and health
benefits because we do not have a system of national
health insurance, and the use of the tax system as an instrument of national economic policy. As long as the tax
system continues to be subject to these powerful and important forces, we are going to continue to have a complicated tax system, whether the tax is an income tax or a
consumption tax.
Can the proponents of the consumption tax plausibly
assert that the consumption tax will be more immune to
these deep-seated reasons for complexity than the income
tax has been? This does not seem likely. The roots of
complexity go beyond the nature of the particular tax imposed. There is no "quick fix" for the problem of complexity of the federal tax system.
Moreover, enacting a completely different tax such as
the consumption tax would create a great deal of confusion and complexity as people were getting used to it.
Therefore, although the issue of eradicating complexity
is one of their strongest arguments, I do not believe that
the proponents of a consumption tax overcome the income tax on this issue.
SUMMARY OF THE COMPARISON OF THE CONSUMPTION TAx
AND THE INCOME TAx

I have discussed the history of the consumption tax and

1985]

FEDERAL TAXATION

921

how it works. I have compared it to the income tax using
a variety of measures. I believe I have shown that the advocates of the consumption tax do not appear to have carried their burden of showing that the tax would be so far
superior to the mixed type of income tax that we have
now that we should undergo the great inconvenience of
abolishing our present tax and acquainting the public with
an entirely new type of tax. Nevertheless, the debate has
been exceedingly useful in helping us to understand our
present mixed tax and why it works the way it does. This
has been the assertion of supporters of the consumption
tax who have always agreed that, although it might not be
feasible to do away with the present income tax, the debate would help to understand the present tax system
better.
OTHER ALTERNATIVES TO THE INCOME TAX

While the consumption tax is the major alternative that
critics have offered as a replacement for the American income tax, other possibilities have been advanced as well.
The two other major possibilities are the so-called flat
rate tax, and the value-added tax. Neither of these can be
considered a realistic substitute for the present American
income tax.
The flat rate tax is not really intended as a full-scale
substitute for the present American income tax but is
merely a variation - and a minor variation at that - of
the present American income tax. While there are several
different proposals offered by academians and politicians,
the same theory underlies each. That theory is that the
system of graduated income brackets should be compressed into just a few brackets. In its most extreme version the system of brackets is eliminated entirely and
there is only one proportional tax on income, hence the
term "flat tax." In addition most proposals eliminate
some deductions such as the casualty loss deduction or
the deduction for medical expenses (both of these were in
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fact significantly limited by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982).
In the end the flat-tax proposals, therefore, change relatively little of the present American income tax. They
simply tinker with it. Adoption of any of the current flat
tax proposals would not materially simplify the Internal
Revenue Code, since the complexity of the Code stems
not from the existence of a substantial number of graduated brackets but from questions of what to properly include in the tax base (i.e. the variety of deductions,
credits, and exclusions) against which the brackets are applied. The problem of the tax base is not addressed in
any comprehensive fashion by any of the flat-tax proposals. The recent proposals of the Treasury Department,
which have been adopted in modified form by the Reagan
Administration, offer some simplications but do not substantially simplify the Internal Revenue Code.
The value-added tax (VAT) is a form of sales tax in
which a tax is imposed on a product at each stage in its
production, from raw material to finished product. As
such, VAT is a form of sales tax and is therefore a tax on
transactions rather than on individuals. VAT therefore
suffers from the two major drawbacks of sales tax: (1) The
amount of revenue it can raise is limited in comparison
with the income tax or the consumption tax and (2) it is
regressive. The regressive nature of VAT can be mitigated somewhat by excepting from its reach necessities
such as food. Nevertheless the economists' consumption
function demonstrates the fact that lower income people
spend a greater percentage of their income than higher
income people. Thus VAT will inevitably extract a higher
percentage bite from the income of lower income people
than from the income of higher income people.
For these reasons, neither the flat rate tax nor the value
added tax is a realistic alternative to the present American
income tax.
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THE THEORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

The discussion has lead to several conclusions. It has
shown that the present American income tax is not really
an income tax at all, but rather a combination of both incomes and consumption tax components. The discussion
has also demonstrated that the arguments for replacing
the present mixed tax with a pure consumption tax or any
other kind of tax are not persuasive. Also, and significantly for the purposes of this discussion, it has been
shown that the American federal tax system, whether it be
fundamentally based on income or on consumption, is going to remain complex.
Out of this discussion emerges the theory of federal income taxation:
The Americanfederal income tax is a combination of both income
tax and consumption tax concepts. It is madefurther complex by a
variety of powerful political and socialforces. None of this is going
to change in theforeseeablefuture. Suggested changes in the system
should be developed in recognition of these circumstances.
This discussion further demonstrates that continually
attempting to develop major sweeping changes that will
drastically simplify the system is an exercise in futility.
[The monster has come to dinner and is staying.] Once
we have reconciled ourselves to living with the ungainly
tax system we and our forebears have created, perhaps
then we can initiate some ad hoc ideas that will make the
ungainly system work just a little bit better.
THE WEALTH TAX

Introduction
An element that could be usefully hammered onto the
federal tax system is a wealth tax. As demonstrated in the
preceding discussion, the American income tax is really a
combination of income and consumption tax elements. It
has thus long since surrendered any claim to theoretical
purity and any accompanying advantages of simplicity.
Moreover, we are not, as stated previously, likely to de-
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velop a theoretically pure tax any time soon. Thus, initiating improvements to the present tax system must involve
making ad hoc changes to what is already an ad hoc system.
A wealth tax added to the present system would tap an
additional legitimate tax base and add balance to the system. Its contribution to the tax revenues would be substantial. As will be discussed below, a wealth tax would
probably increase tax revenues by at least $20 billion annually. This amounts to over 10% of estimated annual
federal budget deficits over the next several years. At the
same time a wealth tax would not misallocate resources,
or be unduly burdensome to any group. It is a logical and
effective ad hoc addition to our already ad hoc system of
federal taxation. The wealth tax is widely used in Europe
and the Indian sub-continent with significant success.
How

A WEALTH TAX WORKS

The wealth tax is levied as a percentage of the taxpayer's net worth. For reasons that I will discuss below,
the wealth tax should provide a credit for income taxes
paid. The literature on this subject describes two forms of
the wealth tax. I believe, however, for reasons set forth
below, that the two forms are really one and the same.
Before setting forth my own critique, I will describe the
two forms of the wealth tax, as seen in the traditional
literature.
The two forms of the wealth tax have various names. I
will call them for convenience the weak form and the
strong form. The weak form of the tax is limited to a relatively small percentage of the taxpayer's net worth. It is
designed to exact a tax of less than a normal rate of return
from the taxpayer's capital. Rates for this weak form of
wealth tax generally hover around 1% or less of the taxpayer's capital subject to the tax.
The strong form of the tax is designed, according to the
traditional view, to take more in tax from the taxpayer's
capital than is produced by a normal rate of return less
income taxes paid. The rate for the strong form is there-
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fore significantly higher than the rate for the weak form.
The strong form is said to be a tax directly on capital, according to the traditional view.
My position is that there is in fact no strong form of the
wealth tax - no wealth tax is imposed on capital. This is
because when a high rate of wealth tax is imposed, the
value of capital subject to the tax drops. This in turn decreases the amount of tax that can be collected by the
wealth tax to an amount that can be paid out of income.
Some numerical examples may serve to illustrate:
Example (1) Let us say T has capital subject to the tax
of $100,000. If this $100,000 is invested in high-grade
corporate bonds paying 10% interest, T's annual income
from this capital will be $10,000. Let us assume further
that T is in the 50% marginal income tax bracket. Therefore on T's $10,000 interest income, he must pay income
tax of $5,000. Let us say also that T is subject to a "weak"
form of the wealth tax, which is imposed at the rate of 1%
on his investment. By virtue of this tax, T must pay an
additional $1,000 in tax. Thus T's income after the income and the wealth tax is $4000. The tax has been paid
out of the income from the bonds. On this set of acts, a
wealth tax has operated like an additional income tax on
investment income.
Example (2) The facts are the same as in Example 1,
except that T is now subject to a "strong" form of the
wealth tax. In this case let us assume that the wealth tax is
at a rate of 7% of capital. Once again, T has interest income from his corporate bonds of $10,000. Being in the
50% bracket, he pays income taxes of $5000. However,
on account of the strong form of the wealth tax, he now
also owes $7000 of wealth tax (7% of $100,000). His total
tax is $12,000, which he cannot pay solely out of income.
Thus he must dip into capital to come up with the extra
$2000. He now has only $98,000 invested. This is the
confiscatory aspect of the strong form of the wealth tax,
according to the literature.
This analysis, however, is flawed. The day a 7% wealth
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tax is imposed the value of T's corporate bonds will drop.
By how much will they drop? Assume for simplicity that
all potential buyers of these bonds are also in the 50%
marginal income tax bracket. The bonds continue to pay
their fixed amount of $10,000 per year. The income tax
on that amount continues to be $5000. However, no one
would pay $100,000 for those bonds if the net after tax
return was a negative $2000. Therefore the bonds must
drop in value by enough to lower the wealth tax to $5000.
The bonds will then drop from $100,000 to a value of
$71,428. (7% of $71,428 equals $5000). This is a onetime drop. Thereafter, the bonds will continue to trade at
around that price and move up and down according to
market factors, such as changes in interest rates. In reality, the price will not drop all the way down to $71,428,
because some of the potential purchasers of these bonds
are not in the 50% marginal bracket. Thus, a taxpayer in
the 30% marginal bracket might find these bonds attractively priced at or near $100,000. This would be so because his income tax would be $3000 and his wealth tax
would be $7000, if the bonds had a value of $100,000.
The bond would not have to drop very much in value for
them to have a net positive return to this taxpayer.
What this discussion demonstrates is that there is no
such thing as the "the strong form" of the wealth tax.
There is no such thing as the wealth tax actually being a
tax on wealth. The wealth tax, no matter what its rate, will
always be payable out of income from the taxpayer's capital subject to the tax, because the property will drop in
value to reflect the imposition of the tax.
Of course, in the case of a wealth tax with a relatively
steep rate, such as the 7% in the example above, taxpayers in the 50% marginal bracket have undergone a relatively stiff "tax" on their capital in the sense that their
capital has undergone a one-time drop in value on the occasion of the first imposition of the tax. That is a different
matter entirely, however, from saying that a wealth tax of
relatively high rate is paid out of capital. It is erroneous

1985]

FEDERAL TAXATION

927

and leads to incorrect policy decisions to maintain that a
wealth tax of relatively high rate is paid out of capital.
Consider, for example, X, an individual, whose wealth
is entirely tied up in $10 million worth of undeveloped
forest lands. These lands generally appreciate 10% every
year. X has no salary and owns no income producing assets. X occasionally sells off some land to meet his modest living expenses. On these facts X has little income
(only what may be realized on his occasional land sales).
Therefore X pays an inconsequential amount of income
tax (assume for simplicity that he pays no income tax).
Assume X is subject to a 7% wealth tax. On these facts X
has unrealized appreciation on the value of his land of $1
million (10% of $10 million) and pays a wealth tax of
$700,000 (7% of $10 million). Thus where X pays little
or no income tax, the wealth tax even at a relatively high
rate does not cause the value of his assets to fall (at least
not to him or others not paying much in income taxes).
Indeed, the wealth tax has led to a relatively reasonable
result, that a taxpayer of great wealth who would not have
otherwise paid any taxes at all, in fact paid some taxes.
Note that X in the example given above is a miser with
established wealth. Therefore X in the example above
would not be significantly reached either by an income tax
or a consumption tax.
This discussion leads to the conclusion that a reasonable way to impose a wealth tax of some significant rate is
to allow a credit or a partial credit against the wealth tax
for income taxes paid with respect to the capital involved.
If that were done, then in our Example 2 above, T, having
paid $5000 in income taxes on his investment income,
would only pay $2000 more in wealth taxes to reach his
7%. That would still leave him with a $3000 after tax return. However, the taxpayer X, above, who owned the
forest land, would derive no benefit from the credit for
income taxes paid, since he pays no income taxes. As we
have discussed, it is appropriate that the wealth tax reach
him more heavily.
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This discussion has assumed a wealth tax of 7%, which
is very much higher than what I would propose or than is
in use in Europe or the Indian sub-continent today. Yet
even with this relatively high rate, the tax, when combined
with a credit for income taxes, works effectively and in a
non-confiscatory manner, not overtaxing those who are
already paying substantial taxes on income from their capital and yet reaching those who are not otherwise taxed.
While it is not presently on the horizon, the wealth tax
may become a useful complement to other methods of
federal taxation, in the era of very high budget deficits.
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